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INTRODUCTION
Michael J. Perry and I were offered positions as Robert W. Woodruff
Professors of Law the same year. The promise of his presence as a colleague
was an important factor in making my decision to come to Emory. When I heard
of his plans to retire, I was prompted to look back over our years together on the
faculty, wondering how either the Law School or I would fare without Michael’s
presence. He has been an exemplary colleague from an institutional perspective,
a source of steady guidance in matters of policy and practice, as well as a major
contributor to Emory’s scholarly reputation. As an individual colleague, Michael
has been the source of ideas and inspiration, as well as friendship and support.
He takes the time to learn about and engage with issues and areas of concern or
interest to others and often sends comments, links to relevant news items, and
scholarly papers addressing those interests.

*
Robert W Woodruff Professor of Law; Founding Director, Vulnerability and the Human Condition
Initiative, Emory University; Member, American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
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I was relieved to learn that while his institutional activity may be reduced,
Michael fully intends to continue to enthusiastically pursue his scholarly
interests after retirement. Recently, he suggested that the two of us convene and
co-edit papers from a conference on constructing an ethical or moral approach
to state responsibility, to be held in the fall of 2022. This conference will explore
and contrast his approach to international human rights principles with my fairly
recently developed vulnerability analysis, which presents an alternative to both
a rights-based approach to and a social contract paradigm for thinking about state
responsibility.
With the prospect of this planned joint endeavor in mind, I was delighted to
be offered an opportunity to comment on Michael’s recent work for this special
edition of the Emory Law Journal. This Essay can be considered a first step in
setting the stage for this future collaboration. I begin in Part I by describing
Michael’s approach to human rights as set forth in his latest manuscript. I also
present a brief description of vulnerability theory, which is based on the
recognition of dependency as inherent to the human condition, necessitating
reliance on social institutions and relationships through which we build the
resilience allowing us to persevere—even thrive—in the face of our
vulnerability.1 The conclusion introduces some areas for consideration in the

1
The purpose of this Essay is not to fully explore vulnerability theory but to set out ways in which its
emphasis on the limitations of the physical, developmental body might suggest different questions, concerns,
and sets of collective responsibility than does a human rights approach. For those interested in learning more
about vulnerability theory, see generally Martha Albertson Fineman, Universality, Vulnerability, and Collective
Responsibility, LES ATELIERS DE L’ÉTHIQUE / ETHICS F., Winter 2021, at 103 [hereinafter Fineman, Universality,
Vulnerability, and Collective Responsibility]; Martha Albertson Fineman, Beyond Equality and Discrimination,
73 SMU L. REV. F. 51 (2020); Martha Albertson Fineman, Vulnerability and Social Justice, 53 VAL. U. L. REV.
341 (2019) [hereinafter Fineman, Vulnerability and Social Justice]; Martha Albertson Fineman, Vulnerability
and Inevitable Inequality, 4 OSLO L. REV. 133 (2017) [hereinafter Fineman, Vulnerability and Inevitable
Inequality]; Martha Albertson Fineman, Equality and Difference–The Restrained State, 66 ALA. L. REV. 609
(2015); Martha Albertson Fineman, Vulnerability, Resilience, and LGBT Youth, 23 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV.
307 (2014); Martha Albertson Fineman, “Elderly” as Vulnerable: Rethinking the Nature of Individual and
Societal Responsibility, 20 ELDER L.J. 71 (2012); Martha Albertson Fineman, Beyond Identities: The Limits of
an Antidiscrimination Approach to Equality, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1713 (2012) [hereinafter Fineman, Beyond
Identities]; Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 EMORY L.J. 251
(2011) [hereinafter Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State]; Martha Albertson Fineman,
Evolving Images of Gender and Equality: A Feminist Journey, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 437 (2009); Martha
Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 1 (2008) [hereinafter Fineman, Anchoring Equality]; Martha Albertson Fineman, Reasoning from the
Body: Universal Vulnerability and Social Justice, in A JURISPRUDENCE OF THE BODY 17 (Chris Dietz et al. eds.,
2020) [hereinafter Fineman, Reasoning from the Body]; Martha Albertson Fineman, The Limits of Equality:
Vulnerability and Inevitable Inequality, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 73 (Robin West
& Cynthia Grant Bowman eds., 2019) [hereinafter Fineman, The Limits of Equality]; Martha Albertson Fineman,
Injury in the Unresponsive State: Writing the Vulnerable Subject into Neo-Liberal Legal Culture, in INJURY AND
INJUSTICE: THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF HARM AND REDRESS 50 (Anne Bloom et al. eds., 2018).
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planned conference, comparing a human rights approach to that of vulnerability
theory as ways to understand and argue for social justice.
I.

THE MORALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Michael’s most recent work-in-progress, Interrogating the Morality of
Human Rights,2 addresses both international human rights and American
constitutional jurisprudence, two areas of law in which he has had a major
impact. This latest addition is certain to add to his stellar reputation as a scholar.
The manuscript is not a compendium of his academic work, nor does it merely
summarize his approach to the many issues he has considered over his career.
He does not aspire to—nor does he—resolve all the controversies and
contestations that might be raised regarding a rights-based mode of analysis.
Instead, he offers an elegant, coherent, and comprehensive argument for
appreciating existing international human rights doctrine and dicta as
representing a moral code to guide governmental actions and individual lives.3
He sets out the following in the Introduction:
My aim in this book is to clarify and interrogate the morality of human
rights, by which I mean the morality embodied in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and/or in one or more of the several
international human rights treaties that have entered into force in the
period since the adoption of the Universal Declaration, in 1948, by the
UN General Assembly. That morality . . . is mainly but not exclusively
a political morality.4

I have italicized the words “embodied in,” which sets out the aim of the book.
Significantly, these words indicate that the conception of morality that Michael
is exploring and advocating for is one that is expressly articulated in or
extrapolated from various human rights documents. As so defined (and
confined), his exploration of morality can be seen as mainly descriptive:
morality is bound to texts in ways a more wide-ranging and abstract search for
a normative understanding of the term would not be.
This “embodied in” (or textually directed) conception of morality also
shapes my response to the manuscript. There is a significant, but often
2
Michael Perry, Interrogating the Morality of Human Rights (Dec. 5, 2021) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author).
3
See id. at 2.
4
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The manuscript distinguishes between the morality of human
rights and the law of human rights, although it also addresses U.S. constitutional law when it is deemed to
overlap with international human rights principles. Id. Morality in the context of this discussion is also defined
as “mainly, although not exclusively a political morality.” Id.
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overlooked, difference between considering morality as a “descriptive” task and
reflecting on the “normative” content or unbounded possibilities of the concept.5
This distinction suggests different methods and modes of analysis,
distinguishing projects of concrete or textual assessment from those undertaken
in a more abstract or ambiguous manner. In addition, both the basic questions
initially raised, as well as the burden of persuasion, may be decidedly different
for an author choosing to address morality in its descriptive rather than its
normative sense in making an argument. The preliminary inquiry becomes more
about what “is” (which is largely an empirical, text-based analysis) than what
“ought” to be (which is more contextual and potentially value- or biasdetermined).6
Of course, morality in its descriptive sense does not totally avoid the
conceptual problems associated with the normative approach. Those problems
are just displaced, often deflected onto those individuals or institutions that have
made preliminary normative choices in forming their version of a moral code. If
it is determined that those individuals or institutions are legitimate and their
authority is accepted, an author need only explain, explore, and interpret the text
consistent with those initial choices and revelations.
In Interrogating the Morality of Human Rights, Michael considers the
normative aspect of morality as resolved in the United Nations’ process of
drafting the various Human Rights Declarations and Conventions that form the
texts for analysis.7 The implicit argument is that these documents should be
accepted as a collectively constructed normative judgement on what constitutes
5
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy states that morality is used in two distinct ways: (1)
“descriptively to refer to certain codes of conduct put forward by a society or group . . . or accepted by an
individual for her own behavior,” or (2) “normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given specified
conditions, would be put forward by all rational people.” The Definition of Morality, THE STAN. ENCYC. OF
PHIL., https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/morality-definition/ (Sept. 8, 2020). The society or group constituting
the human rights community has codified their understanding of moral behavior in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the other documents referred to in this manuscript, which form the texts constituting the basis
of Michael’s analysis of morality. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10,
1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
Even after reading Michael’s elegant manuscript, I remain skeptical about the ability of contemporary
human rights doctrine to serve as a platform for a moral paradigm suitable for the emerging problems of the
twenty-first century. For that reason, I think the normative debate about morality must be engaged. It is in this
arena that the difficult questions will arise when comparing rights with vulnerability: What are the “specified
conditions” that must be central in constructing a normative sense of morality? The last part of this Essay sets
forth some of these questions. See infra Part V.
6
This is not to suggest that various interpretations of a text are not possible, but the words (and possibly
the history) do act to constrain the plausible number of interpretations. Values, virtues, and aspirations, by
contrast, can be as varied as the individuals entering the debates.
7
See Perry, supra note 2, ch. 1, at 1, 5–6.
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morality.8 They present coherent, internally consistent standards for assessing
moral action. These principles, produced through negotiations and deliberations,
also can be represented as a universal judgment—transcending national,
cultural, temporal, and political boundaries. With the normative judgement
resolved, the descriptive project is then to state the implications and limitations
of the morality so inscribed and to interpret the applicability of the texts to
situations and circumstances not explicitly resolved.
II. DIFFERENCE AND THE UNIVERSAL
Difficult questions have been raised about imposing unitary or universal
moral or ethical standards given the diversity that exists across human beings,
as well as the myriad of cultures and political arrangements that have been
constructed across time and space.9 Michael does not ignore these difficulties.
However, consistent with the manuscript’s descriptive task, those issues are (at
least implicitly) resolved by reference to the process that generated the human
rights’ canon.10
A. Sources of the Universal
As briefly noted above, in Interrogating the Morality of Human Rights, the
process of producing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other
human rights documents serves to both articulate and justify a universal vision.11
The manuscript dutifully considers other sources for determining what unites us
across our real and contrived differences in place, politics, position, and
privilege. For example, the theistic or religious and natural law explanations,
which rely on some transcendent source of rights, is fleetingly discussed.12
However, it is the secular language of the Universal Declaration of Human

8

See id. at 5–6.
For example, one of the basic issues for a universal theory is identifying a common human
characteristic that will support a claim of general applicability (the conferral of “rights” within a human rights
paradigm) to all individuals and most human endeavors. See generally MORAL UNIVERSALISM AND PLURALISM:
NOMOS XLIX (Henry S. Richardson & Melissa S. Williams eds., 2008) (exploring such difficulties). The
difficulty is with the idea that rights or ethics apply regardless of differences due to demographics like race,
gender, religion, or culture. The search for universality is challenged by the very value modern
jurisprudence places on diversity. The search is for ways in which universalist principles can ethically and
logically coexist with these particularities of difference.
10
See Perry, supra note 2, ch. 1, at 5–6.
11
See supra Part I.
12
See Perry, supra note 2, ch. 2, at 2–6.
9
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Rights that Michael looks to in order to answer the question of what can and
should unite us across our differences.13
In an interesting way, this adherence to a descriptive, rather than a
normative, sense of morality assists in legitimating the claim for the universality
in the human rights paradigm. The claim is not based on the nature of the rights
identified, but on the communal or universal scope of the political agreement or
consent that produced and affirms these rights.14 The United Nations have come
together to resolve the question of morality (at least for contemporary
audiences), setting forth a consensus generated with integrity through a process
that has been both inclusive and democratic.
This reliance on the political and the procedural for legitimation is consistent
with the way Michael generally understands the implications and consequences
of a human rights approach. He argues that rights as conceived in the U.N.
documents are rules of conduct that specifically direct governments to either do
or not do something for human beings.15 The implications for individuals are not
forgotten but are not the principal focus. This is evident when Michael states
that although the morality of human rights is not only a political morality, it is
“mainly” so.16 Political is used here in a narrow, institutional sense—morality is
political in nature (or primarily so) when it is designed to apply to governmental
bodies.17 The term indicates who (or what) is deemed to be appropriately bound
by this moral code, which is a very different question from the more nebulous
inquiry into what types of action (or inaction) may or may not have political
consequences or whether they are produced by politics or have political
implications.
B. What Is Universal?
Establishing that there is a legitimating process for a descriptive project,
Michael’s next task is to identify the fundamental principles or concepts chosen
to capture the essence of morality. Surprisingly, for someone who adopts a
descriptive or textual analysis, Michael does not rely on the express language of
Preamble or Article I of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, both of
which identify the “inherent dignity” from which the “equal and inalienable
13

See id. ch. 1, at 2, 7.
See id. at 1–2.
15
Id. at 2–3. Considering human rights as the product of governmental processes supports the idea that a
consensus among governments provides a basis for universal application.
16
Id. at 6.
17
This public or collective sense of political morality also will ultimately influence how the morality or
appropriateness of individual actions and sensibilities will be understood in society.
14
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rights of all members of the human family” derive as the unifying ideal.18
Instead, he ultimately rests on the concept of a “spirit of brotherhood” as
articulating the moral spirit of the human rights documents.19
This is not only an interesting choice but it also may be a strategically
significant one. There is a recognized difficulty in defining a generally agreed
upon definition of dignity. Michael considers and finds inadequate dictionary
definitions of the term and also rejects the theistic answers that have been offered
to resolve the question of exactly what exemplifies human dignity.20 He sees (a
gender-inclusive sense of) brotherhood as suggesting a more easily understood
and thus more productive and positive direction.21 Brotherhood as a metaphor
exemplifies the connection that naturally exists among people who belong to the
same family (the brotherhood of man) and as a result are united in an allinclusive creative force shaped by nonerotic universal love.22
In this manuscript, agape (exemplified by brotherly love) is identified as the
unifying moral “sensibility” or sensitivity.23 It is defined as the force that guides
human activity motivated and inspired by the need to do what we, as human
beings, can do to make a better world not only for ourselves, but also for others.24
This sense of morality is not only (or even primarily) ascribed to us as
individuals but rather expresses the ultimate project of humanity, a project that
must also serve as the foundation for human rights.25 With this understanding of
morality as encapsulated within the spirit of brotherhood, human rights is cast
18
Universal Declaration, supra note 5, pmbl.; see also id. art. I (“All human beings are born free and
equal in dignity and rights.”).
19
Perry, supra note 2, ch. 2, at 6–7, 11–12; see also Universal Declaration, supra note 5, art. 1 (using the
term).
20
See Perry, supra note 2, ch. 2, at 2–7.
21
See id. at 6–7; Universal Declaration, supra note 5, art. 1 (“All human beings are born free and equal
in dignity and rights.”).
22
See Perry, supra note 2, ch. 2, at 15. The concept of agape that informs this sense of brotherhood is
often referred to as Christian, but Michael intends to employ it as a secular concept. He does not say so, but it
could be viewed as an evolutionary imperative—the need to make the world (our environment) conducive to
human flourishing or risk decline and possible extinction. I would like to see further development of Michael’s
idea of a secular version of a universal love or an “agapalistic” ideal as the foundation of human rights. See id.
at 15–18.
23
See Perry, supra note 2, ch. 2, at 15.
24
See id.
25
Significantly, it is also not a project that describes an existing universal characteristic ascribed to the
individual as a characteristic, such as dignity. Instead, it is an aspirational collective human project, presumably
independent of any specific individual actions or intention, defined by the principles embedded in the documents
(and consensus) under review—to act in the spirit of brotherhood. This may also avoid Brian Leiter’s critique
that there can be no universal right to equality because human beings are not equally situated. See id. at 9.
Michael suggests an equal treatment mandate is not based on equal characteristics but is a project of humanity,
one that is not limited to individuals with or without specific features or traits. See id.
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as a secular and very human, rather than a theistic or divine, project.26 It also
suggests that morality extends beyond the individual to encompass a structural
or governmental mandate, one that is both altruistic and society-preserving.
Unfortunately, the language of rights tends to dilute the sense of the social in
favor of the individual when it comes to what constitutes foundational principles
in the human rights discourse.
C. Equality and Freedom
Michael identifies a “right to moral equality” and a “right to moral freedom”
as the foundational rights in his human rights moral vision.27 He also finds a
version of both concepts mirrored in the United States Constitution. Moral
equality is reflected in the Equal Protection guarantee, while moral freedom is
paralleled by the right to privacy.28
As Michael recognizes, neither of these foundational human rights is
absolute. The moral right to equality, for example, does not mean that everyone
must be treated the same. He specifically notes that children are not entitled to
vote and that a moral sense of equality does not require that food stamps be
provided for the affluent.29 Moral freedom is also qualified. While it may
generally protect the individual from governmental imposition of restrictive
regulations or rules punishing thought, conscience, or religious belief, some
minimally restrictive, carefully tailored rules are permitted if they are necessary
to protect the public.30 However, the emphasis is clearly on preserving and
protecting individual prerogatives.
Michael uses the balance of the manuscript to explore the application of
these fundamental moral rights in the context of three contentious issues: (1)
capital punishment, (2) same-sex marriage, and (3) abortion.31 In each of these
areas, the state is setting the terms or conditions that will govern the “rights” of
the individual—to life, to access to a significant social institution, or to
determine whether or not to proceed with a pregnancy undeterred by
governmental edicts.

26

See id. at 3, 17–18.
Perry, supra note 2, intro., at 3.
28
Id. It is interesting that the moral right to freedom is expressed in terms of privacy, rather than liberty.
Privacy as a constitutional concept is consistently under attack by strict, textual constitutional scholars, while
liberty is very much a part of the foundational documents in the United States. See id. ch. 4, at 21–23.
29
Perry, supra note 2, ch. 3, at 7–8.
30
Id. ch. 4, at 9–11.
31
See id. chs. 5–7.
27
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Chapter 8 considers who decides if human rights apply, which touches upon
the role and limitations of the judiciary in a human rights regime.32 Chapter 9
addresses poverty as a human rights issue,33 while Chapter 10 considers the ways
in which extreme economic inequality and global warming are often seen as
overreaching the rights paradigm or as examples of rights inflation.34 Michael’s
task in this manuscript is not to resolve these persistent and difficult social policy
issues but to explore how an analysis formed from the morality of human rights
and undertaken in the spirit of brotherhood might guide such decision-making.
III. WHAT IS WRONG WITH RIGHTS?
My concern about the progressive tendency to resort to human rights is not
with the values, objectives, or conclusions that such an analysis might reach.
Rather, it is with the questions that are left unanswered—or even unasked. Like
any good scholarship, Interrogating the Morality of Human Rights provokes
thoughts about where one’s own work fits within the scholarly vision presented.
Michael’s resolution of what factors should determine the role of the state
regarding the three pressing moral issues considered in the manuscript does not
conflict with those I would have reached. Nor do I disagree with the
considerations he deems relevant in evaluating poverty or climate change.
However, it is not only the conclusion that matters—process and procedure are
also worthy of principled consideration. In addition, an important part of any
theoretical inquiry lies in the initial framing of the foundational questions to be
addressed. The answers to such questions often determine the logic of any
subsequent inquiries.
I began this Essay by focusing on descriptive morality as the conceptual
boundary for Michael’s manuscript35 because it clarifies how my vulnerability
approach differs from a morality of human rights paradigm. Michael and I are
both interested in developing a robust conception of social justice and exploring
the ways in which the law can assist in realizing it. However, the focus of our
inquiries is different, as is our reliance on and faith in the concept of rights to
broaden the understanding of state responsibility. I have long been skeptical of
the ability of a rights-based analysis to deliver a comprehensive and universal
vision of justice. I have also been exploring the concepts of vulnerability and

32
33
34
35

See id. ch. 8.
See id. ch. 9.
See id. ch. 10.
See supra Part II.
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dependency to imagine an alternative set of principles for articulating an
expansive, universal conception of state responsibility.36
A. Constructing the Collective
Both a human rights and a vulnerability approach are concerned with the
rules governing human beings and the societies in which they live. However, a
rights-based approach is grounded in liberal legal and political theory, whereas
the individual of theoretical concern is the venerated holder of rights, ideally
autonomous, independent, and cherishing his individual liberty.37 In contrast,
vulnerability theory views this particular construct of the individual as
ideological and “empirically indefensible” when assessing the appropriate
relationship between the individual and society.38 A vulnerability analysis
argues that a concern with rights focuses on the individual as an entitled and
independent actor and consequently tends to “obscure[] the continuous and basic
role the state plays in society as a whole, as well as the ways in which it defines
the lives of all individuals within it.”39
The whole idea of individual rights tends to assume an ideally restrained or
necessarily aloof state that may provide some basic essential services but is
fundamentally uninvolved in orchestrating the mundane aspects of individual
lives. The idea of individual rights, understood in its “negative” sense, serves as
a check on the development of an overly active state.40 Of course, the idea of
human rights can also be used to make positive claims for economic or social
benefits against the state. However, broadly constructed positive rights claims
are historically viewed as exceptional, in need of justification, disfavored, and,
if recognized, are often in practice under- or unenforceable.41
36

See, e.g., Fineman, Vulnerability and Social Justice, supra note 1, at 342, 367–69.
See Fineman, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 1, at 19.
38
Id. In a vulnerability analysis, rights-based arguments are seen as often ignoring or minimizing the
complexity of the human condition, which means the paradigm is not reliably and justly responsive to actual
human needs. See id. There is also a general problem with the individualistic nature of rights as a concept. The
idea of individual rights (whether for children or adults) reflects the conceptual flaws characteristic of the
traditional, limited notions of the legal subject, with its commitment to individual autonomy, liberty,
independence, and agency. A rights-based model assumes the individual as a legal subject can be conceived
outside of social institutions and relationships. This leads to ultimately positioning the individual so conceived
as perpetually in danger from an abusive and antagonistic state, a view that has affected how those on both the
left and the right of the political spectrum view the potential for state action. See Fineman, Vulnerability and
Social Justice, supra note 1, at 342.
39
Fineman, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 1, at 26.
40
See ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 121–31 (1970).
41
See Jorge M. Farinacci-Fernós, Looking Beyond the Negative-Positive Rights Distinction: Analyzing
Constitutional Rights According to their Nature, Effect, and Reach, 41 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 31,
31–34 (2018). Some scholars feel that “socioeconomic rights are not really constitutional rights.” Id. at 40. For
37
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In traditional liberal thought, state or collective action is posited as
theoretically antagonistic and inherently problematic for venerated individual
liberty.42 The characteristics of the individual subject at the center of law and
policy (the “rights holder”) are such that they minimize the need for and
ultimately pathologize the possibility of individual reliance on the collective (in
either its social or governmental form). This is particularly true if such reliance
could result in the encroachment of another individual’s rights (such as to liberty
or property).
This liberal legal subject, cast as independent, autonomous, and libertyseeking, leaves the body behind.43 The human being at the center of law is thus
perceived outside of social relationships, which are the structures both in which
we experience vulnerability and upon which we depend for the resources to
ameliorate such vulnerability. This legal subject is a radically individualized
entity, abandoned to legal tools and devices such as consent, contract,
independence, self-sufficiency, self-reliance, and rights, which are woefully
inadequate to address the inescapable and lifelong dependence on society and
its institutions that our vulnerability produces.44 As a result, a rights-based
analysis operates in a manner that, at least initially, is resistant to state-initiated
or propelled redistributions of economic or political power or privilege in favor
of individualized remedies.
By contrast, vulnerability theory views a robust and active state as essential
to both the well-being of the individual and the reproduction of society.45
Vulnerability theory concedes the inevitability of law, as well as some form of
governing authority, while also appreciating the potential of the state as a unique
mechanism for the construction of a just society.46 Additionally, the theory

example, Farinacci-Fernós stated the following:
Though many countries have included welfare rights or obligations in their constitutions, no
democratic country has placed social and economic rights on precisely the same legal footing as
the familiar civil and political liberties. While I may disagree with the current universality of this
affirmation, since I believe that some democratic countries have given some socioeconomic
rights the same legal footing [sic] their civil and political counterparts, [Mary Ann] Glendon’s
point is highly relevant as to the generalized problem of under-enforcement that results in
undervaluation of socioeconomic rights.
Id. (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).
42
See Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, supra note 1, at 258; Fineman,
Reasoning of the Body, supra note 1, at 19.
43
See Fineman, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 1, at 19.
44
See Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, supra note 1, at 262–64.
45
Fineman, Vulnerability and Social Justice, supra note 1, at 342, 366–69.
46
See Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, supra note 1, at 255–56, 263–64.
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recognizes that the argument about the role of the state is not whether it should
have greater (or lesser) involvement, but rather the justness of the myriad ways
in which the state is currently (and always) acting in creating society through the
creation and maintenance of the social institutions and relationships in which we
all live our day-to-day lives. While it is a critical theory, vulnerability theory is
distinguished from other “‘progressive’ approaches that seem unable to move
far beyond a focus on an oversimplistic notion of an abusive or punitive state”
in that it recognizes the necessity for and the inevitability of governance and law,
as well as the positive potential this represents.47
B. Foundational Questions and First Principles
Ironically, I initially thought of vulnerability theory as presenting a stealth
approach to human rights—one designed with an individualistic American
audience in mind.48 I have come to realize that characterization was both
inaccurate and misleading. Vulnerability theory grew out of my earlier work on
dependency49 and as a result it has always focused more on understanding the
“human” rather than the “rights” facet of the trope. The implications of this
distinction between rights and the human have become even more evident over
time as the theory has developed.
Significantly, when the focus is on rights, the foundational question is very
different than that which is posed by an inquiry into what it means to be human.
In Interrogating the Morality of Human Rights, Michael sets forth his basic
inquiry in the first few pages of the first chapter: “What is a human right?”50
Consistent with his textual approach, he directs further inquiry by asking,
“[W]hat does the term ‘human right’ mean [] in the context of discourse about
such rights?”51 In contrast, vulnerability theory begins by asking the question,
“What does it mean to be human?”52
The difference between the initial focus of each approach influences which
subsequent questions are developed and evolve, as well as determining which
values, objectives, and remedies are considered primary to defining a just
society. Of particular significance is the way the choice between a focus on the
meaning of rights versus the human will differently shape the task of defining

47
48
49
50
51
52

Fineman, Universality, Vulnerability, and Collective Responsibility, supra note 1, at 105.
Id. at 255.
See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY (2004).
Perry, supra note 2, ch. 1, at 1–2.
Id. at 2.
Fineman, Vulnerability and Social Justice, supra note 1, at 357.
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the individual’s relationship to the state or collective, as well as the perception
of the role of law and governance in a just society. The nature and logic of the
inquiry into what constitutes justice will differ depending on whether our initial
focus is on the nature of rights or the nature of the human condition.
Both the vulnerability theory’s fundamental question of what it means to be
human and Michael’s inquiry into what constitutes a human right are descriptive,
or empirical, questions—they rely on something in existence. However, instead
of looking to existing documents or relying on established jurisprudential
conclusions to find an answer, vulnerability theory undertakes to define the
essence of the inherent human condition.53 This search is for what might be
labeled a “first principle”—the shared characteristic of humanness that cannot
be further reduced or refined, one that is present over time and space.54
The fundamental reality of the human condition is our “embodiment.”55 We
are, in essence, corporeal beings, vulnerable or susceptible to changes in both
our physical and social well-being over the life course.56 Vulnerability theory
thus begins with the fragile materiality of the body, not with rights or assertions
or assumptions about rationality, choice, or assumed preferences for liberty and
autonomy. The body here is understood as an anthropological or ontological
concept—a universal construct that precedes law, morality, politics, or
economics. It is essentially finite, mutable, and inevitably dependent.57
IV. REASONING FROM THE BODY: THE SUBJECTS AND OBJECT[IVE]S
OF LAW
Beginning with the body means confronting in our theory and practice the
realities of the body and its resulting vulnerability or susceptibility to change

53
See id. at 356, 357 n.87. I describe vulnerability theory’s foundational question as empirical or
descriptive, but it is also qualitatively different from that which Michael undertakes. He describes the moral
position as determined in various U.N. documents—a textual analysis into what is described as a human right.
See Perry, supra note 2, ch. 1, at 1–2, 5. In contrast, defining the essence of what it means to be human is a
material, empirical inquiry relying on the experiential and intuitive. One basic way to distinguish our inquiries
is to realize that while the texts he describes are human rights documents, a vulnerability analysis ultimately uses
the body as its fundamental text.
54
See First Principle, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/first-principle (last visited
Apr. 29, 2022) (“[A]ny axiom, law, or abstraction assumed and regarded as representing the highest possible
degree of generalization”); Fineman, Universality, Vulnerability, and Collective Responsibility, supra note 1, at
106 (“To be human is to be vulnerable.”).
55
See Fineman, Vulnerability and Inevitable Inequality, supra note 1, at 142.
56
Id.
57
See Fineman, Vulnerability and Social Justice, supra note 1, at 358.
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over time in both its physical and social status.58 Universal and fundamental,
vulnerability defines the human condition.59 It is not a characteristic of only
some individuals or groups, nor does it differ in quality or degree from one
individual or group to another (although it is often portrayed in that manner).60
We are all always vulnerable, as there is no position of invulnerability.”61 What
is variable among individuals are the amount and quality of the resources or
resilience each has with which to adapt, adjust, compensate, and ameliorate
universal vulnerability. This should be central to our theories of justice and the
politics of allocating individual and collective responsibility.
Importantly, beginning our theoretical inquiry with the body shifts the focus
of analysis away from categories of demographic difference and assessments of
the position of some groupings of individuals. Instead, the initial focus is on the
designated social purposes of the contrived institutions and relationships that
have been established to provide essential resources or assets of resilience to
individuals and well-being to society.
The veracities of our bodies necessitate that we live in these social or
institutional contexts throughout life; they provide us with the resilience
necessary not only to survive but also to thrive in the face of our vulnerability.62
58
Id. The changes in bodily well-being can be negative, resulting from traumatic external sources, such
as accidents or natural or contrived disasters. Negative changes are also the result of illness or bodily decline.
Fineman, Vulnerability and Inevitable Inequality, supra note 1, at 142. However, changes are often positive in
nature: the result of taking advantage of socially structured opportunities, such as in medicine or technology, but
also prompted by services and resources provided in the social networks and systems in which we live. Positive
changes also can arise as the body matures, developing greater capacity for intellectual, emotional, and creative
endeavors. See Fineman, Vulnerability and Social Justice, supra note 1, at 358. Some changes are predictable
and even preventable. Others, while not preventable, can prompt ameliorative social policy and programs.
However, some changes are beyond either individual or social control.
59
See Fineman, Anchoring Equality, supra note 1, at 1. When I refer to the human condition, I am
indicating a universal human characteristic—an empirical reality that shapes human circumstances and
experiences and exists across time and space, as well as within cultures and throughout history. In contrast,
referring to “human nature” has normative implications: it is a term often applied to the propensities or
proclivities of human beings to act in certain ways that can and do vary over time and within societies. Both the
tendency toward and the socially acceptable nature of responses to the human condition vary and are shaped by
things like culture, history, and the interpretations of individual and group experiences. See Fineman,
Vulnerability and Social Justice, supra note 1, at 357 n.87. Human nature is a societal conclusion about what is
natural or to be anticipated—society’s consensus on the inevitability of specific responses to the human
condition.
60
“Vulnerability” is a widely used term. Colloquially, the use of the term “vulnerable” designates an
individual or group as disadvantaged, discriminated against, subordinated, weak, or in need of special protection.
Vulnerability theory gives an alternative, specific, and precise meaning to the term “vulnerability,” defining it
as a term of art. As such, “vulnerability” is positioned as a foundational concept upon which the other
components of the theory rely.
61
Fineman, Vulnerability and Inevitable Inequality, supra note 1, at 142.
62
See Fineman, Vulnerability and Social Justice, supra note 1, at 362–63.
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Because we are embodied beings, we are inevitably “embedded” within these
social institutions and structures—we are dependent on them.63 Under
vulnerability theory, the nature, limits, and needs of the body are seen as both
the origin of and justification for society and its institutions.64 The material and
developmental limitations of the body necessitate the formation of responsive
structures—families, communities, governing systems, and organizations of
service, care, and protection.
Significantly, individual dependence on social institutions is constant but the
nature of that dependence varies and fluctuates over time in response to the
circumstances or developmental stage in which we are located. We depend on
different institutions and relationships over time, depending on changes in
situation and circumstance. For example, we are completely dependent on
comprehensive care from others as infants.65 However, the birth family recedes
and other institutions typically become more prominent later in an individual’s
life, when the need for care arises only occasionally (such as when we are ill or
injured). Our dependence is more centered on extrafamilial social organizations,
such as those comprising the educational, community, employment, and
financial systems.
In thinking about the individual within lifelong institutional contexts, it is
important to realize that social arrangements encompassed within the family,
healthcare, and employment/market systems operate “simultaneously and
sequentially.”66 A weakness in one system can be compensated by a strength in
another. A strong family can help minimize the impact of a less-than-sterling
educational system.67 However, it is also true that successful acquisition of
resources in one stage, such as education in childhood, profoundly affects the
possibility of success in subsequent social stages, such as in the university or
employment.68

63

Id. at 358–60.
This articulation of the justification for law and governance is related to, but more comprehensive than,
feminist ethics-of-care theories, which are based on individual relationships of care and do not extend to defining
a general collective ethic on a societal or governmental level. They are also contextual, based on establishing
caring relationships. In contrast, vulnerability theory centers on the institution, not the individual, and the
corresponding responsibility of care is the governmental obligation to care for everyone subject to the structures
and mechanisms of governance. This obligation forms the foundation of governmental legitimacy. See Fineman,
Vulnerability and Inevitable Inequality, supra note 1, at 134.
65
See Fineman, Vulnerability and Social Justice, supra note 1, at 360–61.
66
Fineman, Vulnerability and Inevitable Inequality, supra note 1, at 147.
67
Fineman, Vulnerability and Social Justice, supra note 1, at 364.
68
See Fineman, Vulnerability and Inevitable Inequality, supra note 1, at 147.
64
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While individual dependence on any specific institutional arrangements can
be thought of as episodic, alterable, and circumstantial, it is essential to
recognize and theoretically address the reality that dependency on some set of
social institutions and relationships—be they the market, financial and
employments systems, or educational and health care institutions—is inevitable
and ongoing for everyone throughout life.69 This understanding of the nature and
extent of human dependence on social institutions and relationships is crucial to
grasping vulnerability theory as an alternative to both a human rights and a social
contract paradigm for thinking about responsibility and the nature of social
justice.70 The resilience-conferring social institutions and relationships in which
we live our lives are constructed and maintained by the law and are essential
instruments of either attaining or frustrating social justice in society.71 They are
creatures of the state and therefore the state has the responsibility to construct,
monitor, regulate, and maintain them in a just manner.72
A “robust” sense of social justice and collective or societal responsibility
must be built upon the fundamental recognition, acceptance, and appreciation of
human vulnerability and dependence.73 An embodied, inherently socially
embedded subject should be at the center of our theories. An embodied
vulnerable subject should replace not only the independent actor adorned with
ability, agency, and assurance that constitutes the holder of rights but also the
“reasonable man” of law, the artificial and inapt “rational” man of economics,
and the contracting man of political theory.74 This vulnerable theoretical subject
allows us to incorporate complex needs and relationships inherent to the human
condition into how we think about the role of government and the nature of both
individual and collective responsibility in ways its liberal, autonomous, and
independent cousin does not.
V. NOT EQUALITY, BUT DEPENDENCE; NOT FREEDOM, BUT
RESPONSIBILITY
As Michael indicates in Chapters 9 and 10, the project of defining a moral
vision for a twenty-first century overwhelmed with global warming, pandemics,
poverty, and mounting economic and political inequality is existentially

69
70
71
72
73
74

See id. at 134.
See Fineman, Vulnerability and Social Justice, supra note 1, at 342.
See id.
See id. at 366–67.
See id. at 367–69.
See id. at 355–56.
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compelling.75 I anticipate that developing this vision will be the focus of our
upcoming workshop and I am hopeful that the sense of morality we ultimately
build will be comprehensive and inclusive. To me, this means it must be based
not upon abstract rights but upon the actualities of the human condition:
responsive to our universal vulnerability and the resulting dependence on social
institutions and relationships that it entails.
The family is a compelling metaphor for the development of a moral
sensibility responsive to the needs of others. However, I would suggest that the
relevant image of family connection is not the tie of brotherhood. The sibling
relationship is a generational bond between those who are of equal status and
assumed independent capabilities, even if related. When considering the social
implications of vulnerability and dependency, the appropriate family connection
should clearly incorporate the moral responsibility or obligation inherent to the
situation of asymmetric need and capacity. This is a bond not of equality but of
empathy and compassion; it is a bond that recognizes and validates the reality of
inherent dependency that constitutes the circumstances in which we live our dayto-day lives.76
A. Beyond Individual Rights to Collective Societal Responsibility
One of the significant issues I hope to consider in our future workshop
contrasting vulnerability theory with human rights is that of the extent and nature
of state responsibility. To consider how responsibility might be allocated
between the individual and the state, we must also consider questions regarding
state (or government) authority: How is it constituted and how does it manifest
itself? What exactly is the role of the state and how does it shape our notions of
individual responsibility?
Vulnerability theory appreciates and advocates for the democratic state as a
uniquely positioned mechanism for the construction of a just and inclusive
society.77 This is not an argument that the state functions in that way, merely
that it has more potential for doing so than do the alternatives. This potential has
been impaired and frustrated by an impoverished notion of equality and liberty,
which tolerates only a limited, constrained vision of the state. The resulting

75

See Perry, supra note 2, chs. 9–10.
The familial image of the parental (whether paternal or maternal) caretaker might come to mind in this
context. Unfortunately, those familial images have been tarnished by negative associations with the concept of
“paternalism,” a response considered politically inappropriate as inconsistent with liberal illusions of individual
independence and invulnerability.
77
See Fineman, Beyond Identities, supra note 1, at 1763.
76
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diminished notion of state responsibility has left societal well-being to the
hapless individual or displaced onto a largely privatized set of unrepresentative
and unregulated societal institutions.78 Vulnerability theory challenges this
impaired vision, drawing on the potential of law to craft a concept of social or
inclusive justice built around an “ethics of care.”79
Viewing societal institutions and relationships as central to the reproduction
of society, vulnerability theory concedes not only the inevitability but also the
desirability of some form of governing authority that is manifested through law.
Vulnerability theory posits that, given the innate human condition of
vulnerability and dependency, not only is there ample justification for the state
(or system of governance) but also a vigorous and responsive state is essential
to individual and collective well-being.80 Beyond the necessity of governance
and law, the theory also recognizes the positive potential that governing systems
have to respond to and improve the human condition. The theory appreciates and
builds upon the potential of the state as a unique mechanism for the construction
of a just society, thus distinguishing it from other “progressive” approaches that
seem unable to move beyond an oversimplistic notion of an inevitably abusive
or punitive state.81
B. Dependence Beyond (and Before) Equality
The limitations of equality as a model for social transformation is the second
issue we must address in a future workshop. Equality serves well as a measure
for action when unwarranted discrimination is the issue; “one person, one vote”
or “equal pay for equal work” are sound principles, as is the general requirement
of equal protection.82 However, not all situations of inequality are situations of
inappropriate discrimination. What is needed in some circumstances cannot be
resolved by anti-discrimination measures but by the imposition or allocation of
unequal measures of social responsibility or resources.83
78

See Fineman, Universality, Vulnerability, and Collective Responsibility, supra note 1, at 109.
Id. at 108; see Fineman, Vulnerability and Social Justice, supra note 1, at 367–69; Fineman, The Limits
of Equality, supra note 1, at 82, 89–90.
80
See Fineman, Vulnerability and Social Justice, supra note 1, at 367–68.
81
See Fineman, Anchoring Equality, supra note 1, at 1–2. Vulnerability theory recognizes that the state
can be corrupted, compromised, and co-opted, and may be abusive and intrusive. See id. at 18. These are
tendencies that are shared by any system of rules and coercion. The state, at least if it is a democratic entity, is
susceptible to correction and monitoring by those it must rely upon for its legitimacy and perpetuation (citizens).
In contrast, if the state is absent or impaired, the power void will be filled by the rules and regulations developed
by private entities, such as multinational corporations, insurance companies, or weaponized individuals or
groups with autocratic tendencies.
82
See Fineman, Vulnerability and Inevitable Inequality, supra note 1, at 135.
83
See id. at 134–38.
79
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For example, many of the reciprocal arrangements found within our societal
institutions are inherently unequal relationships.84 They incorporate different,
complementary roles and functions, defined by legally or culturally imposed
obligations, expectations, responsibilities, and benefits. These unequal social
identities are initially “shaped by and conform to the ways” the institutions in
which they are located have been defined.85 For example, the parent/child
relationship is shaped by the role of the family within society. Parents are
socially and legally responsible for the support and welfare of their children and
these responsibilities are “[complemented] by the legal doctrines of parental
rights and family privacy.”86
The parent/child relationship is perhaps the most “straightforward” example
of a situation in which there is a need for conferral of unequal levels of authority
and expectations.87 However, the same sort of reciprocal but unequal
relationship also defines other paired social identities. For example, professional
relationships—such as those between a doctor and patient, or an attorney and
client—are situations of “underlying inequality in knowledge, resources, and
access to institutional structures that warrant an asymmetric allocation of
responsibility.”88 The same is true of other paired social relations with differing
requirements reflecting differences in skill, ability, and responsibility. Indeed,
“[i]nequality in position, need, and context is also the reality when it comes to
intergenerational equalities inherent in considering things like environmental
practice and policies, for example.”89
Specifically, such relationships “are situations of ‘inevitable’ or ‘necessary’
inequality from a theoretical perspective in which the social responsibilities and
functions are complementary, but different.”90 These unequal social identities
are not “natural and inevitable” in form and consequences, although they may
correspond to “natural human impulses and emotions.”91 “As legal or social
relationships, they are constructed by policy choices in which the state, through
law, confers not only responsibility but also power and privilege.”92

84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92

See Fineman, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 1, at 30.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Although these “inherently unequal social relationships or identities
represent major areas of life, historically they have conceptually been relegated
to the ‘private’ sphere—whether it be designated ‘family’ or ‘market’ and
wrongfully perceived as presumptively outside of state action and regulation.”93
Recognizing “the perpetually active role of the state in the construction and
maintenance of these identities and the institutions in which they are located
demands a robust response from critical theorists focused on institutional design
and the allocation of privilege and benefits.”94
CONCLUSION: FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS
The morality inquiry Michael and I will undertake in our workshop on
human rights and vulnerability theory will encompass the historical question of
how and why existing social relationships and institutions have been
fashioned.95 It should also examine the contemporary justifications for the
existing organization of these social institutions and relationships—for the
allocation of unequal privilege and advantage within any given relationship.
Further, it should seek to answer the following questions: From both an
empirical and a theoretical perspective, are the political and rhetorical
justifications historically offered in support of these social arrangements
justified by the actual (as compared with the theoretical or ideological)
contemporary functioning of these institutions and relationships? How can we
better structure these essential social relationships of inevitable inequality given
current realities so that they operate more justly and fairly and provide more in
the way of public benefits? This is not an inquiry into what rights the individual
may possess but a question about the nature and extent of collective or social
responsibility. This is also not an inquiry resolved by a simplistic resort to the
mantras of either freedom or equality.
I look forward to the consideration (if not the resolution) of these and many
more important issues of fundamental social justice. I am confident that both the
human rights and the vulnerability paradigms will have a role to play in our
workshop and more generally as we confront the challenges emerging in the
twenty-first century. I am equally confident that the significant contributions to
both human rights theory and constitutional jurisprudence that my dear
93
Id. These “private” areas are also locations where it is difficult for norms, such as those imposed by a
human rights analysis, to reach. Human rights are primarily recognized as directing governmental actions and
entities.
94
Id.
95
Here, I am collapsing the morality question into the justice inquiry: Are these institutions justly
organized and operational? This is a societal level inquiry, not an individual one.

FINEMAN_6.22.22

2022]

6/23/2022 12:03 PM

RIGHTS, RESILIENCE, AND RESPONSIBILITY

1455

colleague Michael J. Perry has already made will be an important part of those
considerations.

